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Appendix C. 481. Introduction
There has been a recent academic and public interest in revenue neutral environmental
tax reforms. An important question when discussing environmental tax reforms has
been the possibility for the government to reap a double dividend. An environmental
tax reform yields a double dividend if it (i) creates environmental benefits and (ii)
reduces existing tax distortions. The second postulate results from the argument that
the magnitude of environmental benefits is largely unknown due to missing markets for
environmental quality, see Goulder (1995). Thus, if different welfare components
move in opposite direction there is no guarantee that overall welfare changes are
positive. Some authors, e. g. FitzRoy (1996), emphasize that a missing double
dividend might be a serious obstacle for an environmental tax reform to get ever
implemented.
There exist a number of theoretical models that analyze the existence of double
dividends. However, to our best knowledge no attempt has been made to test these
models empirically. This paper analyzes the empirical possibility of double dividends
using an extended version of the indirect tax reform model of Ahmad and Stern (1984).
The extension allows for environmental externalities and follows the work of Orosel
and Schob (1995), Schob (1996), and Pirttil and Schob (1996). This framework allows
us to identify the crucial parameters on which welfare enhancing tax reform proposals
are based. These parameters are the marginal cost of public funds and the
environmental benefits that will be defined below. In order to calculate theseparameters we need to estimate the uncompensated demand elasticities. Hence, the
question arises which demand system to use to estimate the elasticities.
One of the major obstacles to the practical application of optimal taxation theory is the
dependence of the results on the specification on the demand systems employed to
estimate the reactions of the consumers. This problem might be less severe in the
context of marginal tax reforms. However, Decoster and Schokkaert (3990) and
Madden (1996) have shown that the dynamic specification is of importance for the
sensitivity of marginal tax reform proposals based on welfare analysis. These authors
estimate various versions of Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS), the Rotterdam model of Theil (1975), the CBS model of Keller and
van Driel (1985) and Stone's (1954) Linear Expenditure System (LES). With the
exception of the LES, the tax proposals of all deterministic specifications yield highly
correlated results. Except for the LES all systems have in common that they can be
understood as a Taylor approximation of first order to any demand function. Therefore,
it is not surprising that these papers find that tax proposals are relatively insensitive to
the deterministic specification. In the light of this result we choose the AIDS as a
deterministic specification and analyze tax reform proposals using different dynamic
specifications. The choice of the AIDS is further justified, since the indirect utility
function of the AIDS is known. This is not the case for the Rotterdam model and the
CBS model. The indirect utility function is also known in the case of the LES, but as
Deaton (1987) has pointed out that its functional form is so restrictive that itpredetermines the outcomes of tax proposals independently of the particular parameter
estimates.
The data set we use is a sample of German monthly consumption survey data,
disaggregated into three household types. The time period we choose is January 1969-
December 1995. Therefore, we have substantially more degrees of freedom than other
papers that analyze marginal tax reforms through econometric demand analysis. This
data set also gives us the possibility to analyze various dynamic specifications, which
cannot be estimated in a lot of cases due to the lack of degrees of freedom.
1 Also
because we have data by household groups (a sample of elderly persons, low-income
and high-income workers, each with their own price indices), the results may indicate
how tax reform proposals affect different household groups. In addition the analysis of
the tax reform proposals may indicate how sensitive the demand specifications are
across different household groups.
Each AIDS specification incorporates a different stochastic and dynamic specification.
Our starting point is, as in Anderson and Blundell (1982), a general lag structure from
which we derive six versions of the AIDS model along the lines of Wickens and.
Breusch (1988). These versions enable us to estimate the long run relationship
between budget shares of commodity expenditure, prices and income. We also
estimate the static AIDS model plus a quadratic and a linear time trend. However, all
We do not present any estimation results in this paper due to space restirctions. However, these
are available from the author on request.
5these models yield positive own price elasticities. This contradicts neoclassical
household theory and has the implausible policy implication that in order to yield
environmental benefits the government should cut the energy tax, although energy is
assumed to be a polluting commodity!
An explanation for this result might be that the standard demand system completely
neglects technological progress. Technological progress has the consequence that the
energy efficiency of energy consuming commodities is rising constantly. Therefore,
energy demand should react less sensitive to energy price decreases. Energy prices
have been falling since the mid 1980's and therefore the neglect of technological
progress might be responsible for an estimated positive value of own price elasticity of
energy demand. We model technological progress for energy and gasoline efficiency
as a restricted time trend. We follow some parts of the literature on computable
general equilibrium models and assume that the efficiency of energy and gasoline use
grows at the exponential rate of 0,01 (e. g. Burniaux, Martin, et al. (1992) p. 104). We
choose this form of modeling technological progress for convenience as it avoids
additional nonlinearities in the equation system to be estimated. We do not estimate, as
done in Decoster and Schokkaert (1990) and Madden (1996), any difference versions
of the AIDS. It is a standard result of time series analysis that difference versions
might neglect important long-run information about the levels of the variables. And,
indeed, models estimated in differences and in levels typically yield very different
results.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical
framework of analysis. Section 3 sets up the econometric framework and section 4
describes the results. Section 5 gives some conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
Our approach to measure tax distortions and environmental benefits follows previous
work on this topic closely. We extend the indirect tax reform model of Ahmad and
Stern (1984) along the lines of Orosel and Schob (1995), Schob (1996), and Pirttil and
Schob (1996) in order to account for environmental externalities. We will develop the
crucial parameters of interest in this section.
We assume that there are constant returns to scale in production and that there, are no
pure profits, so that tax changes are reflected as consumer price changes only. We
assume that the government requires a fixed and exogenous revenue.














and where x' denotes the n +1 vector of private commodities, with x0 as the untaxed
numeraire. /' denotes the income of household /. The variable q denotes the consumer
price vector. The consumer price vector q can be written as a function of the producerprice vector/? and the vector of taxes t, in the following way:
If factor incomes and producer prices are fixed we may speak interchangeably of
changes in, and derivatives with respect to, q and t. Since we assume that 'the
government is not able to levy lump sum taxes, we can neglect the dependence of the
variables on /' for all i=l;2;...h.
du\x
l;z)
The variable z denotes environmental quality, i. e. >0, for all i-l;2;...h ,
dz
which is a public good. The variable X} for j=0;l;...;n denotes the aggregated demand
for commodity j and is given by:
It is assumed that environmental quality z depends on the consumption of the
commodities Xe and X<, in the following way:
(2.3,
where the subscripts e and g stand for energy and gasoline. We also assume that
consumption of private goods and environmental quality are weakly separable.
~\ i
Therefore, we have —-—O'for all i=l;2;...h and j=0;l;...;n. The assumption of weak
dz
separability enables us to divide the welfare effect that results from a change of the taxsystem into welfare effects related only to changes in the consumption of the public
good environmental quality (environmental benefits) and those related to changes in
the consumption of private goods (private benefits). Under the assumption of weak
separability follow the uncompensated demand functions of individual households
from (2.2) and (2.3):
Xj = x){q;V) for all i=l;2;...h and/=0;7;...;«.
The revenue constraint of the government is:
n





where R denotes government revenue, and ti denotes the specific tax on commodity i.
Now consider a tax reform that changes tk and adjusts t; such that the government
revenue constraint is fulfilled. Differentiation of (2.1) under consideration of (2.2) and
(2.3) yields:
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(2.6) gives the necessary adjustment of r; in order to keep the government revenue




















 k dV dz
effective tax rate as a proportion of the consumer price. The variable (3' denotes the
social marginal utility of income of household /, or the welfare weight. The variable r\'
represents the social marginal utility of environmental quality of household /. Note that
pV and r\' are positive. fV and r\' are value judgments and considered as exogenous.
The variable zah is the uncompensated cross price elasticity of aggregated demand
10h
2 between goods a and b
2 Note also that £T|' determines social welfare, which results
1=1 ••:•••
from the public goods characteristic of environmental quality.
The first term in (2.7) describes the change in welfare due to a change in the
consumption of private goods. This term neglects environmental quality. In the
brackets of the first term stands the difference in marginal cost of public funds of tax t,
and tk. Therefore, the first term is positive and contributes to a social welfare increase,
if the marginal cost of public funds of t, is greater then the marginal cost of public
funds of tk. This, of course, is a standard result of optimal taxation that neglects
environmental externalities. A tax reform yields private benefits if:
h h
(2.8) MCFi = £=* >
 l— = MCFk.
Inequality (2.8) states that in order to yield private benefits the government should
raise taxes with a low MCF and should cut taxes with a high MCF. The larger the
inequality the larger the private benefits that arise from raising tk and cutting tl. If (2.8)
Note the following relationship between the uncompensated cross-price elasticities for aggregated
demand, zub, and the uncompensated cross-price elasticities for individual household demand,
e«. • £.b=Bs.lL =iLy^L =JLyll.^Lx'a=J-.j\qaX'aE[ih. Also note thatis fulfilled the tax reform yields an increase in the welfare component that is derived
from the consumption of private goods. In the numerator of MCFfc stands the marginal
reaction of social welfare W that results from a change of the consumption of private
goods, neglecting any changes in environmental quality, to a marginal change of tk. In
the denominator we find the marginal tax revenue of tk. Therefore, MCFfc gives the
effect of a change in the consumption of private goods on social welfare per additional
unit of government revenue that is raised through an increase in tk.
For a better understanding of the welfare judgments of various tax proposals and its






The inverse of MCF^ gives the necessary cut in revenue if welfare is to be increased
by one unit through a reduction of tk. The first part on the right hand side gives the
reciprocal of Feldstein's (1972) distributional characteristic of the good k. If the
welfare weights (3' for all i=l;2;...h equal unity, that is all individuals are treated the
same by the government, then this term would always equal one for all goods and it
would not contribute to any differences in the various MCF. If the welfare weights are
different for individual households this term plays a role in the ranking of the MCF.
12Bibjiothek des Instituts
•iflr Weltwirtschaft Kiel
Consider the case where the government favors household; and sets (3
; = 1 and fi' = 0
for all i>j. Taking the effect of the first term only, the highest MCF would be for the
good with the highest consumption share by household / in its total. A government that
cares only about household; would therefore raise a tax with a low value for x( and a
high value for Xk and cut a tax on a commodity that is consumed disproportionately
more by household) than by other households. The second term measures the demand
responses on revenue. It is clear that a MCF is small if the tax increase causes only
little substitutional effects by households.
Since we have data for three different household types, we can investigate the impact
























Table 1: Welfare weights.
The welfare indicator MCF] 11 allows us to analyze the private welfare benefits of tax
reforms according to a Kaldor-Hicks criterion. The government compares losses and
gains of the different household groups and calculates whether the gains outweigh the
losses. The gains and losses are calculated as Hick's equivalent income variations for
each household. The difference between MCFlll^ and MC/H.ll/ gives then the
income that would be left over after the winners have compensated the losers.
13The other three MCF allow us to calculate how a tax reform is judged by a single
household type. This allows us to asses the winners and losers of a tax reform.
Additionally, if all household types judge a tax reform in the same way it is possible to
achieve Pareto improvements, since everybody will be better off at least on the basis
of private benefits.
The second term in (2.7), analogously to Schob (1996), describes the difference in the
marginal environmental impact of the tax rates tt and tk. The marginal environmental
impact of t} is positive if the consumption of the polluting commodities decreases after
an increase in /,. The second term in (2.7) is positive if the marginal environmental
impact of tk exceeds mat of tt. However, the marginal environmental impact of tk and
tt is not calculable for us, because we do not have any data that allow us to draw
h
conclusions about the magnitude of the terms ^T|' and z • Since there is no market for
the public good environmental quality, r\' cannot be observed. Also z is not known in
a lot of cases due to a lack.of information. All that is known with certainty about r\';
and z are the signs. Therefore, we do not estimate the marginal environmental impact
of the various tax rates. We estimate only whether a tax reform might create
environmental benefits through a reduction of the consumption of the polluting
commodities Xe and Xg.
An environmental tax reform yields environmental benefits as long as: : ; •..;
14(2.9) EBk = ZekXe+EgkXg < telXe+zglXg
;=i 7=1 '•.
In the numerator of EB^ stands the marginal reaction of the aggregated demand of
polluting commodities to a marginal change of tk. In the denominator we find the
marginal tax revenue of tk. Therefore, EB^ gives the change in aggregated demand for
polluting goods per additional unit of government revenue that is raised through an
increase in tk. It is more convenient to express the change in polluting demand per unit
of revenue raised through tk instead of per unit of tax change, since this takes into
account the effects of tax changes on the budget constraint of the government.
Therefore, the comparison of EB^ and EB\ takes into account that the marginal
revenue of a tax rate determines how much a tax rate has to be raised or how much
other tax rates can be cut in order to keep government revenue constant. The higher
the marginal revenue of a tax rate the better it is for the government to raise this tax
since the tax has to be increased only a little to achieve an additional unit of
government revenue. Analogously, it is better for the government to cut tax rates that
have a relative smallmarginal revenue.
If the inequality in (2.9) is fulfilled, the aggregated demand of polluting commodities
decreases if tk increases and t, decreases. Therefore, in order to yield environmental
benefits, the government should raise the tax with the lower EB and cut the tax with
the higher EB. The larger the inequality the larger the environmental benefits that arise
15from raising tk and cutting i,. If (2.9.) is fulfilled the tax reform yields an increase in the
welfare component that is derived from the public good environmental quality.
Our objective is to analyze whether a revenue environmental tax reforms might be able
to yield a double dividend. For this purpose we need to calculate the MCF and EB.
These parameters determine the existence of a double dividend. If an environmental
tax reform yields environmental benefits and private benefits at the same time, it yields
a double dividend. In this case the welfare components that are derived from the
consumption of the public good environmental quality and of private goods are both
improving. The determination of the EB makes sure that there are environmental
benefits, although the exact size cannot be determined, because the terms ]T T)' and z
cannot be observed. In order to calculate these parameters we need the uncompensated
demand elasticities and the tax rates xp for j=0;l;...;n. These are derived in the next
section. -; i^::
3. Econometric framework
In this section we estimate the potential for a double dividend using monthly German
data from 1969:01 to 1995:12 on ten commodity groups of consumer expenditure. We
consider aggregate consumer behavior for three different types of households. Type 1
is a two-person household of elderly married couples with low income, typically
consisting of a pension or other public assistance. Types 2 and 3 are four person
households consisting of a married couple and at least one child under 15 years of age.
16The difference between household type 2 and 3 is that household type 2 are
households of a low income blue- or white collar worker while household 3 consists
only of high income white collar workers. The exact classification can be found in the
publications of the Statistisches Bundesamt. Household type 2 and 3 are single earner
families, so that the assumption of inelastic labor supply may be appropriate. The
expenditure data were available in the following categories:
(i) exOl =food food
(ii) exO2 = clothing cloth
(iii) exO3 = housing services rent
(iv) exO4 = energy energ
(v) exO5 = other expenditures on housekeeping houseex
(vi) exO6 = cosmetics and health products cosm
(vii) exO7 = transportation and communication services without gasoline trans
(viii) exO8 = gasoline gas
(ix) exO9 = educational and cultural goods and services cult
(x) exlO = personal goods pers
Also available were commodity price indices for each of the three household types
except the gasoline price index. Here we choose a price index for all German
households. The polluting commodities are assumed to be energy and gasoline.
Expenditures on housekeeping consists mostly of expenditure for furniture and
household appliances, like washing machines etc. Educational and cultural goods and
services include mostly expenditure during leisure time, for expample cinema, theater,
and books. Persona] goods include services such as travelling.
We assume that changes in the vector of budget shares sh are responses to anticipated
17and unanticipated changes in the price vector q arid income / in an attempt to maintain
a long-run relationship of the form:
sh(t) = Tl-a(t),
where ait) is a vector containing prices, income and an intercept term. Such a model
may be written in vector notation, using the lag operator L, as:
shit) = X y^'shit) + X n^ ait),
i=\ i=\
where y, and z[ are vectors associated with endogenous and exogenous variables,
respectively. The lag operator is such that shit - /) = L
lshit), i=l;2;...;n. In order to
obtain the the matrix U that describes the long run relationship between shit) and
m
ait), 'we subtrac shit^Ji on both sides. After some rearranging and
reparameterization we obtain: .
• ' m "'''•'•••' n
(3.10) shit) = Uait) + Y K:(l - L
l)sh(t) + T Z,(l - L
l)a(t),
where
For more details on this see Anderson and Blundell (1982) and Wickens and Breusch
(1988).
18We assume that the long-ran relationship takes the form of Deaton and Muellbauer* s
(1980) almost ideal demand system (AIDS) with:
10
FI • a(t) - a + ]T g( In qf + b(ln I-In PI)
and:
10 j 10 10
1 /1
10
The price index PI is approximated through the Stone price index ^
in order to obtain linearity of the demand system. This approximation method is
common in empirical works estimating the AIDS. See e.g. Deaton Muellbauer (1980).
Since the shares shit i= /,..., 10 have to add up to one, we have the following
restrictions:
10 10 10 '
Further we want to impose homogeneity and symmetry in the long-run. Homogeneity
10
yields ]T £,y = 0 and the symmetry of the Slutzky matrix implies gi} = gjt.
;=1 •' • •• •• • .
The equation system (3.10) is specified most generally if Y{ and Z, are specified as
general matrices and high numbers are chosen for n and m. However, due to datalimitations, we are restricted to choose rather restrictive ' versions of demand
specification. For example if we specify m=n=72 and specify fi and Z, as general
matrices we would need about seventy years of monthly data to estimate our ten
commodity demand system. Since the data constraint is such that it is impossible for us
to estimate nested forms we estimate demand specifications which are contained as
special cases in (3.10). This strategy is justified by the following reasoning: Usually, it
is stated that the parameter estimates of the long-run economic structure vary
substantially with the dynamic specification (see e.g. Anderson, Blundell (1982)). This
sensitivity highlights how critical the dynamic specification is in ultimately drawing
conclusions about the long-run economic structure. Therefore, we estimate different
dynamic specifications of our demand system and we show that at least the policy
conclusions do not vary substantially with the dynamic specification. As in Madden
(1996) we are not making any inferences regarding what is the best demand system.
Since we are not able to estimate the nested dynamic specification, the choice of any
particular system as best is problematic. There are non-nested tests, see the literature
quoted in Madden (1996), but in general there does not appear to be any well-
established procedure which would allow one to unambiguously choose between non-
nested models. Thus, the best strategy seems to estimate different specifications of the
AIDS and analyze the policy conclusions for all these specifications. We choose the
following specifications: •••..<•..
20(3.11) shj{t) = aj + + *y(fo/(f) - lnPI{t)) + u{t) AIDS,
= a} + X &y /n -^- + bj {In
(3.12)
12 AR,
shj{t) = a: + J^gjj ln-^^- + bdlnlit) - lnPI{t))















(3.17) +Jjyji(i-L)shj(t) + ^Zjj(Y-L)Jli±LL ALLG
: +Zjtei(\-L){lnI(t)-lnPI(t)) + u(t)
The specification AIDS is the standard static version of the almost ideal demand
system as it is found in Deaton, Muellbauer (1980). AR describes the static version
plus a autoregressive process of 12th order. TT2 is the only specification which is not
a special case of (3.10), but nevertheless it has been estimated frequently, e.g. Ng
(1995). PARA is a partial adjustment version of the AIDS and can also be derived as a
special case of (3.10). AB includes the first lag of all commodity shares in all
equations. BEWLEY includes the static version plus twelve lagged shares of the
corresponding endogenous variable in each equation. ALLG includes AB plus the first
lag of all exogenous variables in each equation.
All demand systems include monthly dummies so that purely seasonal variation in
expenditures is not attributed to the independent variables. According to the German
Statistical Office, (Statistisches Bundesamt), the data before 1986 and after 1986 were
generated with different methods. This structural break is reflected in an additional
dummy. Also one share equation is dropped due to the adding-up restrictions; as
shown in Barten (1969) it is irrelevant for estimation which equation is dropped.
From (3.11) and the identity /?(-x,- = shj we can derive the uncompensated elasticities,
22(3.18)
where 8,7 is Kronecker's delta, i.e. 8,7 = 1 and 8,7 =0, where /* /. In calculating the
elasticities we use the arithmetic mean of the shares sh; for 1995.
In order to calculate the unobservable tax rates Xj, for j=0;l;...;n we express tj in
proportion to the unobservable producer price for goody, pj. In this case we can write:
(3.19) tj=xiqj = xjPj,
where x. is the observable value added tax rate on commodity/ Since q.j = (l + Ty-)/?;-,
(3.19) can be rewritten as:
i+T;











Table 2: Tax rates.
One problem we have encountered in estimating the above demand specifications is
that all these models yield positive own price elasticities. Especially, the own price
elasticity of energy demand is positive, contradicting neoclassical household theory












































Table 3: uncompensated ownprice demand elasticities for energy demand
An explanation for this result might be that all of the above demand specifications
completely neglect technological progress. Technological progress has the
consequence that the energy efficiency of energy and gasoline consuming commodities
is rising constantly. Therefore, energy demand should react less sensitive to energy
price decreases. Energy prices have been falling since the mid nineteen eighties and
;
therefore, the neglect of technological progress might be responsible for an estimated
positive value of own price elasticity of energy demand. Indeed, preliminary research
has shown that estimation of the demand system AIDS from 1969:01 until 1985:12
yields negative uncompensated own price demand elasticities for energy. Therefore,
we provide a simple attempt to model technological progress.
The commodities energy and gasoline have the characteristic that they are not
24consumed directly, but used as an input to use other consumption goods. Energy, for
example, is not consumed directly, but serves as a commodity to use electrical
household appliances. Also gasoline functions as an input to derive a service stream
from the commodity automobile. Therefore, we assume that not the commodities itself,






 energy> gasoline and commodity / to produce a
service c,:
ci = 1 ii
xi> £()4*04''
Eo%
A'o8) f = 1, .../»,/* 4,8 and u(c;z)•
The variable £• reflects the effects of technological progress. We assume that £,,







The utility function reflects not only preferences but also technological characteristics
of the household production function. From the first order conditions of the
maximization problem in (3.20) and the assumption of weak separability between
private and public goods follows that the long-run relationship between shares, prices
and income can be written as:
where /(•) is a continuous function. Assuming now that /(•) = n • a(t), where a(t) is
25a vector containing prices, q, income / ,
0A
an(j an intercept term. If TI takes
the functional form of the almost ideal demand system (AIDS), we obtain the
following equation system in vector notation:
10
a(t) = a + - In PI) - g()4 - 0,01 • t - g08 • 0,01 • t.
and:
10
In PI« • 0,01 • t - shQ% • 0,01 • t.
This form of modeling technological progress has the convenient property that it does
not add any nonlinearities to the demand system.
Except for the demand system TT2 we extend all of the above demand specifications
to include technological progress. Demand specifications including technological
progress are labeled with the prefix tp. The uncompensated own price demand
elasticities are all negative when technological progress is considered. The next table
shows the uncompensated ownprice demand elasticties for energy, estimated with the







































Table 4: uncompensated ownprice demand elasticities for energy demand
In the next section we analyze different tax reforms and their welfare effects as implied
by the demand elasticities that we calculate from different demand systems estimated
for Germany.
4. Empirical results
In this section we give a summary of the estimation results and discuss some of their
political implications.
4.1. Summary of the estimation results
The following statements are referring only to the demand systems that include
technological progress. The smallest demand, system specifications contains 171
parameters. Due to space restrictions it is impossible to present all estimation results.
However, they are available from the author on request. In this section we merely
summarize the estimation results. In a ten commodity AIDS demand system with
imposed homogeneity and symmetry there are 63 parameters that describe the long-run
behavior of households. In the following table we list the number of these parameters


















































Table 5: Number of statistically significant parameters that describe long-run behavior
At the 10% level these results are in accordance with the studies of demand systems
that can be found in the literature. The residuals seem at least partially to show some
systematic movement which indicates serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
Regarding this aspect this paper cannot draw any comparisons with the literature, since
these results are usually not given, or statistics are presented that are designed to
detect only first order serial correlation. In the next section we discuss the policy
implications of the statistical results.
4.2. Policy implications
In this section we discuss some policy implications of the results. After calculating all
MCF and EB we can order them according to their rank. Comparing the ranks of the
MCF and EB gives the effects of tax reforms on the various welfare indicators. For
example if the rank of MCF of the energy tax is higher than the rank MCF of the
gasoline tax, then the energy tax should be cut in order to yield an increase in the
private welfare. Analogously, environmental quality improves if the tax on a
commodity with a high rank of the EB is cut and in exchange the tax of a commodity
with a lower ranking EB should increased. In the appendix we have provided the
28complete ranking of all commodities for the various MCF and EB and demand
systems... , :
Regarding an environmental tax reform, the energy tax and the gasoline tax are the
most interesting ones. Therefore in the next table we present the ranks of the MCF and





















































































Table 6: Rankings of welfare indicators for energy and gasoline.
There seem to be two remarkably stable results. Regarding the energy tax in all
household demand systems household type 1 prefers the energy tax to be cut before all
other tax rates. A similar result holds for household type 2 and the welfare indicator
29MCF111 regarding the gasoline tax. Therefore, a tax reform that wants to create
private benefits for all household types, should not raise the tax on energy or gasoline.
Therefore, an environmental tax reform that yields a double dividend in a strictly
Pareto improving sense must be one without increases in the energy tax or gasoline
tax. A gasoline tax increase can be also rejected in a Kaldor Hicks improving sense.
The intuition for this result is easier understood when we look at the inverse of the
distributional characteristics of the commodities energy and gasoline that can be




















































Table 7: Inverse of the distributional characteristics.
30For household 1 and 2 energy and gasoline, respectively, have the highest
distributional characteristic. This means that when these two goods are taxed,
household 1 and household 2, respectively, carry the highest burden. Another
argument against higher taxation of energy and gasoline are their comparably low



























































































:• ,/ i.;,. Tal?le 8: Ranking of the margiijaLgovernment revenue.
Raising the energy and gasoline taxes leads only to a relatively small additional tax
revenue. Thus, the government is not able to sufficiently compensate households in
form of tax cuts. Tax rates with a small marginal tax revenue are good candidates for a
tax cut, since the effects on the government budget are only small. Hence, the last table
31tells us that also the tax rate on personal goods is a good candidate for a tax cut. This
view is confirmed below.
From the variances in table 4 it follows that for household type 3 distributional
characteristics matter the least. Therefore, the correlation between MCF111 should be
the highest with MCF001, followed by MCF010. For household type 2 and 3
efficiency is more important than for household type 1, since for these two household
types distributional characteristics are quite uniform. Thus, they judge tax reform
proposals more on the basis of government revenue effects.
Now consider how sensitive the.rankings are to the specification of the demand
system. In appendix C we have listed the Spearman rank coefficient that gives the
correlation between the rankings given by each demand system for the EB and the four
MCF. The Spearman rank coefficient r is significant at the 5% level and at the 10%
level, if \r\ > 0,754 and \r\ > 0,611, respectively.
3 As can be seen from the appendix C,
correlation is significant between the various demand specifications. In general we find
that the demand specification seems to be the most important for household type 3. For
this household type the correlation coefficient is the lowest. We find high correlation
between tpAIDS and tpPARA, tpAIDS and tpBEWLEY, tpAIDS and tpAB, tpPARA
and tpAB and tpBEWLEY and tpAB. Thus, we can confirm the result of Madden
' The Spearman rank coefficient r is is significant at the 5% level, if |r|Vn — 1 > t. Where / is the
value of the t-statistic and n is the number of observations. See Dougherty (1992), p. 206.
32(1996) that the correlation between the static AIDS, tpAIDS, and its partial adjustment
version, tpPARA, is very high : ; >
The sensitivity of the rankings are summarized in the next table, where we calculated











Table 9: Sensitivity of the rankings to the demand specifications.
In this section we have shown that a revenue neutral environmental tax reform that
raises the energy tax cannot yield a double dividend according to the Fareto-criterion.
A revenue neutral environmental tax reform that raises the gasoline tax fails to yield a
double dividend according to the Pareto- and also according to Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
However, due to the substitution- and complementary- relationships between the
commodities it might be possible that revenue neutral tax reform might yield a double
dividend by raising other taxes than the energy or gasoline tax. This question is
analyzed in the next two sections. In the third section we analyze whether it is possible
to achieve private benefits if the energy and gasoline tax is recycled in a lump-sum
fashion.
4,2.1. Pareto-improving tax reforms ..:.....-,
In this section we describe marginal revenue neutral tax reforms that tax create an
environmental benefit and are judged as welfare improving from all three household
types. Thus a Pareto-improving tax reform is based on the welfare indicators MGF100,
33MCFOWyMCFOOl, and EB. We label these tax reforms as Pareto-improving since

























































Table 10: Pareto-improving tax reforms.
14 ud means tax on commodity 1 up and tax on commodity 4 down.
There is some degree of consistency in the tax reforms that are suggested by the
different demand systems. All demand systems that suggest tax changes for the same
pair of commodities also suggest tax changes in the same direction.
Note that no strictly improving tax reform involves changes in the gasoline tax. Raising
a gasoline tax would create environmental benefits, but at the same time it increases
also the inefficiency of the tax system from a non-environmental point of view.
Therefore, a trade-off would occur between private and environmental benefits.
34Therefore, the evidence should be rather interpreted that an increase of the energy tax
yields environmental benefits, but lowers private benefits. The main conclusion that we
would like to draw is that it is very likely that an environmental tax reform that raises
the energy or gasoline tax does not yield a double dividend in a strictly Pareto
improving sense. As indicated above, the losers from an energy and gasoline tax
increase would be household type 1 and household type 2, respectively.
Candidates for an environmental tax reform that yield a double dividend and are
mentioned at least four times are the following pairs: • :
taxcut taxincrease
(10) personal goods (6) cosmetics and health products ; ;:
(10) personal goods (9) educational and cultural goods
(2) clothing (9) educational and cultural goods \
(7) transportation and communication (9) educational and cultural goods i
After having shown that an environmental tax reform that involves increases in the
energy or gasoline tax is unlikely to make everybody better off, we might ask whether:
the losses of the losers could be (over)compensated by the gains of the winners. The
purpose of the next section is to apply the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion a^s a measure;
for welfare comparisons.
354.2.2. Kaldor-Hicks-improving tax reforms
Welfare comparisons on the basis of the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion are possible if
we set the welfare weights of the government pV =1, for all i=I;2;S. The welfare


































































































































Table-11: Kaldor-Hicks improving tax reforms. ... ;
The tax reform proposals that yield a double dividend when the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
is employed does not show the consistency that the Pareto improving tax proposals
show. For some pairs of tax changes that are suggested by more than one demand
specification it is not clear in which direction the tax changes should go. For example,
tpALLG suggests to cut the tax on housing services and to raise the tax on cosmetics
and health products. The demand specification tpAR suggests the opposite. All tax
pairs that show this inconsistency are in italics and are underlined.
Three demand specifications suggest to raise the energy tax. To cut the tax on personal
goods and to raise the tax on energy is suggested by two specifications, tpBewley,
tpAR. tpALLG suggests to raise the energy tax and to cut the tax on transportation and
communication services. All other demand specification suggest that the energy and
gasoline tax should not be changed at all.
37Therefore;, the evidence is rather weak that a revenue neutral environmental tax reform
might yield a double dividend according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, when the
energy or gasoline tax is changed. This point is further supported by the next table.









































Table 12: Spearman for EB and the various MCF.
This table gives the Spearman rank coefficient for environmental benefits and the
marginal cost of public funds. The first row gives Spearman rank coefficients for EB
and MCF111. In this row all of the coefficients are negative. The same is true for the
row that gives Spearman rank coefficients for EB and MCF]00 and MCFOIO. For the
row that gives Spearman rank coefficients for EB and MCF001 there are only two
positive values. Thus, the objectives to raise the private welfare of households and to
improve environmental quality are rather contradictory. From this evidence we would
like to draw the conclusion that it is rather difficult to achieve a double dividend, since
the coefficients indicate that the aim of increasing environmental benefits contradicts
the aim of decreasing distortions of the tax system. Table 12 also indicates that the
lower the income the more difficult it is to yield a double dividend.
384.2.3. Recycling the revenue in a lump sum fashion
In this section we analyze if it is possible if the additional revenue of an energy tax or
gasoline tax is recycled through tax cuts in the income tax. Considering that household
types 2 and 3 have only one working family member it seems quite reasonable to
assume that the labor supply of these two household types is inelastic. In this case an
income tax cut might be considered as a labor income tax cut. This interpretation is not
appropriate for household type 1 since the household receives only transfer income. ;
If the marginal revenue of a tax increase is used for lump sum transfers we get the
following expression for the welfare effects of a revenue neutral environmental tax
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From the budget
1 restriction Of the government follows ]T — = X^+
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welfare weights (3
1 we consider only cases where it equals either zero or one. A
welfare weight of zero indicates mat the government does not care about the
corresponding household. Therefore^ it is reasonable to assume that in this case the
39household with welfare weight zero does riot receive any additional lump sum transfer,
h . df " dX- .. . .
so that 2^(3' — -Xk+y.ti—-
L- From this follows the necessary condition for a




This expression is well known in public finance as marginal excess burden MEB.
Multiplication with the qk gives the additional DM amount that the government would
need in order to fulfill the necessary condition for a double dividend. This amount is
calculated in the next table for the energy and gasoline tax and for the four








































































Table 13: MEB of an energy and gasoline tax increase.
40As expected from standard results of optimal taxation, when the proceeds of an energy
or gasoline tax are recycled in a lump sum fashion, it is impossible to compensate all
households. This can be seen in rows 5 and 9. For the energy tax the additional amount
that the government needs to compensate all households, lies between DM 51,30 and
73,74. For the gasoline tax this amount lies between DM 60,31 and 88,10. It is
important to note that the number of all households has been normalized to one when
these numbers were calculated. For the energy tax it is always possible to compensate
a single household type. This is not so for the gasoline tax. In the demand
specifications that model technological progress there exist cases where it is not
possible to compensate household types 2 and 3 even if all the marginal revenue from
a gasoline tax increase is returned to them. It can be also seen that the gasoline tax is
more distortionary than the energy tax. In fact, the table in appendix A suggests that
the gasoline tax is the most distortionary indirect tax in the German tax system, when
only private welfare is considered.
5. Conclusions
The main result of this paper is the lack of empirical evidence supporting the double
dividend hypothesis of a marginal revenue neutral environmental tax reform, when the
energy or gasoline tax is raised. Good candidates for an environmental tax reform that
yields a double dividend are the following pairs: cut the tax on personal goods and
raise the tax on cosmetics- or cultural expenditures, respectively. Other pairs are to
raise the tax on cultural goods and to cut the tax on clothing or transportation
41expenditures. One can also conclude that the least expensive way to raise the energy or
igasoline tax in terms of private welfare is to recylce the additional revenue in form of
tax cuts on personal goods. This is so, because personal goods have the highest
marginal cost of public funds next to energy and gasoline and also a comparable high
ranking of the measure for environmental benefits. Analogous arguments apply for
increases of the tax on cultural goods. Hence, we have found evidence that an
environmental tax reform could yield a double dividend if taxes on personal goods and
cultural goods are changed.
In order to derive these results we have estimated six dynamic specifications of the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). This gives us also the possibility to see how
stable the policy suggestions are and to which degree they depend on the dynamic
specification. In general we find that the demand specification seems to be the most
important for household type 3. For this household type the correlation coefficients are
the lowest.
At least for the Pareto improving tax reforms our suggestions show a certain degree of
consistency., All demand systems that suggest tax changes for the same pair of
commodities also suggest tax changes in the same direction.
One of the major obstacles to the practical application of optimal taxation theory is the
dependence of the results on the specification on; the demand systems used to estimate
the reactions of the consumers. Previous work has shown that especially the dynamic
specification seems to play a role. Therefore, our strategy was to estimate different
42dynamic specifications of a demand system and to show that at least the major policy
conclusions can be considered as stable.
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Sensitivity to demand specification-Spearman rank correlations
tpPARA/EB
MCF111
MCF100
MCF010
MCF001
tpALLG/EB
MCF111
MCF100
MCF010
MCF001
tpBewley/EB
MCF111
MCF100
MCF010
MCF001
tpAR/EB
MCF111
MCF100
MCF010
MCF001
tpAB/EB
MCF111
MCF100
MCF010
MCF001
tpAIDS
0,95
0,96
0,99
0,95
0,90
0,77
0,94
0,98
0,84
0,95
0,82
0,98
0,93
0,98
0,93
0,68
0,75
0,84
0,99
0,68
1,00
0,98
1,00
0,95
0,99
tpPARA
0,76
0,90
0,96
0,90
0,81
0,65
0,94
0,94
0,92
0,81
0,77
0,76
0,85
0,92
0,56
0,95
0,94
0,99
0,96
0,89
tpALLG
0,68
0,89
0,89
0,83
0,84
0,48
0,66
0,84
0,79
0,66
0,77
0,96
0,98
0,95
0,94
tpBewley
0,50
0,73
0,96
0,96
0,79
0,82
0,93
0,93
0,95
0,92
tpAR
0,68
0,76
0,84
0,92
0,66